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This paper studies whether compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision (BCPs) improves bank soundness. BCP compliance assessments provide a 
unique source of information about the quality of bank supervision and regulation around the 
world. We find a significant and positive relationship between bank soundness (measured 
with Moody’s financial strength ratings) and compliance with principles related to 
information provision. Specifically, countries which require banks to report regularly and 
accurately their financial data to regulators and market participants have sounder banks. This 
relationship is robust to controlling for broad indexes of institutional quality, macroeconomic 
variables, sovereign ratings, as well as reverse causality. Measuring soundness through z-
scores yields similar results. These findings emphasize the importance of transparency in 
making supervisory processes effective and strengthening market discipline. Countries 
aiming to upgrade banking regulation and supervision should consider giving priority to 
information provision over other elements of the Core Principles. 
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1. Introduction 
With increasing deregulation and globalization beginning in the 1980s, banking 
systems have become more fragile and banking crises have proliferated, causing or 
aggravating economic downturns and leading to significant fiscal costs (Caprio and 
Klingebiel, 1999). To improve crisis prevention and management, many countries are 
working to upgrade their bank regulation and supervision. This is a complex and difficult 
process, particularly in developing countries, where the required expertise may be scarce, the 
legal environment weak, and governance problems may lead to regulatory capture. But what 
exactly is good regulation and supervision?  How can countries do it with limited resources? 
What should reforms focus on?  
To answer the first question, in 1997 a group of representatives of bank supervisors 
from advanced countries – the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – issued the Core 
Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCPs), a document summarizing best practices in 
the field (Table 1).
1 Most countries in the world have endorsed the BCPs and have 
undertaken to comply with them, making them an almost universal standard for bank 
regulators. Beginning in 1999, the IMF and the World Bank have conducted joint evaluations 
of member countries’ compliance with this standard, mainly within their joint Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).
2 These assessments provide a unique source of 
information about the quality of supervision and regulation around the world.  
                                                 
1 The countries represented in the Committee are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. The Committee 
consults widely with supervisors from non-member countries. 
2 FSAPs are a comprehensive evaluation of the financial sector and include assessments of compliance with 
several standards and codes.  Many FSAPs are published and available on the IMF and World Bank websites.  - 2 - 
 
In this paper, we rely on assessments of compliance with the BCPs to study whether 
better banking supervision and regulation is associated with sounder banks. In addition, we 
look at which elements of the regulatory framework are most closely related to soundness. 
The goal is to shed light on how to prioritize efforts to improve supervision. 
BCP compliance ratings have several advantages as measures of the quality of 
banking supervision and regulation. First, the BCPs are accepted as the blueprint of good 
supervision and regulation worldwide. Second, the assessment takes into account not only 
which laws and regulations are on the books, but also the extent to which they are 
implemented in practice. This is an important distinction. Third, separate compliance 
assessments are available for the 25 core principles, so that it is possible to separate out 
different aspects of supervision. The measure is only on a four-point scale, but to cut finer 
distinctions would likely be unrealistic.  Because the evaluation reflects the judgment of the 
assessors, it inevitably contains an element of subjectivity. To limit subjectivity and ensure 
cross-country comparability, the Basel Committee has developed a standardized 
methodology.
 3 In addition, the evaluations are conducted by expert supervisors from foreign 
countries and reviewed by internal teams at the Fund and the Bank. In any case, to the extent 
that measurement error is independent of bank soundness, it should not bias our results. 
We measure bank soundness using Moody’s financial strength ratings. This is a 
comprehensive measure of the ability of a bank to meet its obligations to depositors and other 
creditors as viewed by specialized analysts. To the extent that Moody’s analysts have access 
to both quantitative and qualitative information about banks and their operating environment, 
ratings should be a more accurate measure of bank soundness than indicators built using only 
                                                 
3 The assessment methodology was published by the Basel Committee in 1999. - 3 - 
 
balance sheet variables (such as reported non-performing loans, profitability, or Z-scores).
4 
Another advantage of Moody’s ratings is they aim at capturing bank solvency independent of 
the safety net, so that cross-country differences in the safety net, which are difficult to 
observe and measure, should not affect the results. A limitation of using Moody’s ratings is 
that it restricts the sample to larger banks, as smaller banks are not rated. Thus, our 
investigation will not address the impact of the regulatory framework on smaller banks. As 
the latter are not likely to be of systemic importance, this limitation should be relatively 
minor. A more serious limitation is that a number of low-income countries have no rated 
banks, and thus are excluded from the sample.
5  
Because so far data on BCP compliance are available only at one point in time, our 
study cannot rely on time series variation. This limitation forces us to be very careful in 
controlling for other potential sources of cross-sectional variation as well as joint 
endogeneity. One important problem is that the BCP compliance indicator may be associated 
with bank soundness because it proxies for the overall quality of the institutional and 
macroeconomic environment rather than capture specific features of supervision. While we 
recognize that this concern cannot be fully laid to rest, we perform extensive robustness tests 
                                                 
4 In support of this view, Sironi (2000) finds that credit ratings outperform balance sheet variable in predicting 
spreads on bank subordinated notes and debentures in Europe. Other studies have shown that changes in credit 
ratings cause changes in equity prices of banks in the U.S. (Schweitzer et al., 1992; Billet et al., 1998) and in 
Europe (Gropp and Richards, 2001), indicating that ratings agency are believed by the market to have superior 
information. In emerging markets, however, this does not seem to be the case (Richards and Deddouche, 1999). 
Rating agencies have been faulted for failing to give advance warnings of bank fragility before the East Asia 
crisis. Our testing strategy does not rely on the suitability of  ratings as early warning signals.    
5 In related work we study the impact of BCP compliance on bank Z-scores, which allows us to investigate a 
larger set of institutions, including smaller banks from poor countries (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, Tressel, 
2006).  - 4 - 
 
controlling for broad indexes of institutional quality, macroeconomic variables, as well as 
sovereign credit ratings.  
A second concern is the endogeneity of supervision. The level of compliance with the 
BCPs is chosen by the countries themselves, and countries with sounder banks may face less 
opposition in enacting more rigorous supervision than countries with distressed banks.
6 On 
the other hand, it can also be argued that countries that have experienced episodes of distress, 
and whose banks are still weak, may have the strongest incentives to upgrade their 
supervisory capacity. So in principle the endogeneity of supervision may bias the relationship 
with soundness in either direction. To take endogeneity into account, we resort to 
instrumental variables estimation.  
We find that an index of overall compliance with the BCPs is positively correlated 
with bank ratings after controlling for institutional quality, the macroeconomic environment, 
and bank characteristics. However, this relationship is not very robust. When we distinguish 
among groups of BCPs, on the other hand, we find a very robust positive relationship 
between compliance with information provision (BCP No. 21) and bank soundness. More 
specifically, countries in which banks have to report regularly and accurately their financial 
data to regulators and market participants have more highly rated banks. The relationship 
between bank soundness and transparency remains even after we instrument for 
transparency, suggesting it does not reflect reverse causality.  
                                                 
6 Another source of endogeneity bias might be that assessors may unconsciously tend to give higher compliance 
ratings to countries whose banks are known to be financially sound. This type of perception bias is called the  
“Halo effect” which occurs when survey respondents respond more favorably to questions about richer 
countries, as explained in Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2004).  - 5 - 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section briefly reviews 
related literature. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. The results of the 
empirical estimation are in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review  
In their empirical studies of bank crisis determinants, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998, 2002) find that countries with better institutions are less likely to 
experience banking crises and are less affected by moral hazard due to deposit insurance. 
They interpret institutional variables such as rule of law and quality of bureaucracy as 
proxies for supervision and regulation, but do not include direct measures of this dimension, 
which were not available at the time.  
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) (BCL) assembled the first extensive cross-country 
database on the characteristics of the supervisory and regulatory framework. The data come 
from a survey of bank supervisors, and measure the presence or absence of a series of 
regulatory features. In the first comprehensive theoretical and empirical study of alternative 
approaches to bank supervision, BCL (2004) find that regulatory and supervisory practices 
that force accurate information disclosure, empower private sector monitoring of banks, and 
foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank 
performance and stability. Specifically, in a cross-country setting they show that regulatory 
and supervisory regimes with these features have suffered fewer crises in the past two 
decades, have lower non-performing loans, and have deeper credit markets.    
One limitation of this study is that survey information reflects whether laws or 
regulations are on the books, but not to what extent they are implemented in practice. - 6 - 
 
Judging from FSAP reports, implementation is a serious concern in many countries. BCP 
compliance assessments allow us to better capture this important dimension, at least to the 
extent the assessors are able to evaluate it. Another difference between our approach and 
BCL is that we use bank ratings as measures of bank soundness in cross-sectional 
regressions, while BCL use the occurrence of systemic banking crises and non-performing 
loans. Because systemic crises are rare events, in BCL’s analysis crises predate information 
on bank regulation and supervision which is available only for the end of the sample period. 
To the extent that bank regulation and supervision may have evolved over the sample, the 
relationships identified may not be accurate.  Non-performing loans do not suffer from this 
problem, but are not usually comparable across countries, since countries have difference 
rules for marking loans as non-performing (Barth et al., 2006). On the other hand, an 
advantage of the BCL survey data is that it does not rely on the subjective views of 
compliance assessors. 
Three papers have used information on BCP compliance to study bank performance: 
An early paper by Sundararajan, Marston, and Basu (2001) uses a sample of 25 countries to 
examine the relationship between an overall index of compliance and bank soundness 
measured by the size of non-performing loans (NPLs) and loan spreads. They found BCP 
compliance not be a significant determinant of soundness. Podpiera (2004) extends the set of 
countries and finds that better BCP compliance lowers NPLs. Das et al. (2004) broadens the 
measure of bank soundness to include also compliance with standards for monetary and 
financial policies, and shows that better regulatory governance is associated with sounder 
banks, particularly in countries with better institutions. - 7 - 
 
We claim that bank ratings are a more accurate measure of bank soundness across 
countries than NPLs, loan spreads, interest margins, or capital adequacy. Because different 
countries have different reporting rules, NPLs are notoriously difficult to compare across 
countries, as already mentioned above. On the other hand, loan spreads or interest margins, 
and capitalization are affected by a variety of forces other than fragility, such as market 
structure, differences in risk-free interest rates and operating costs, and varying capital 
regulation. Another departure from existing studies is that we conduct much more extensive 
robustness test to separate out the effects of banking regulation from those of other country 
characteristics, such as institutional quality and macroeconomic performance. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly in light of the results, our work is the first to explore how 
compliance with different components of the BCPs affects soundness.  
Our study is also related to the growing literature on transparency in financial 
markets. Patel, Balic, and Bwakira (2002) compare transparency and disclosure in emerging 
markets corporations. Mitton (2002) argues that transparency helps weather financial crises, 
as East Asian companies with auditors from major international accounting firms were found 
to have better stock performance after the crisis of 1997-98. Glennerster and Shin (2003) 
shows that countries that disclose more information to the IMF and the markets are rewarded 
through lower borrowing costs. More transparency also attracts more foreign portfolio 
investment (Gelos and Wei, 2005). Perotti and Von Thadden (2005) study how the presence 
of a dominant investor affects a firm decision of how much to disclose. 
 - 8 - 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
Basic Econometric Model 
The empirical model is a basic cross-sectional regression using bank level data. The 
dependent variable is the bank’s rating. Moody’s rates banks’ financial strength on a 15-point 
scale, ranging from E- (least sound) to A+ (most sound). Since this is a limited dependent 
variable, the appropriate econometric model is an ordered probit, which we use to estimate 
the baseline specification. We also show that the results do not change if we transform the 
ratings in a numerical index and estimate an OLS model. Standard errors are clustered by 
country to allow for correlated residuals within each country. Specifically, the regression 
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where the subscript j denotes the country and the subscript i denotes the bank.  
The variable of interest is compliance with the BCPs. Assessors separately rate 
compliance with each principle using a four-point scale.
7 We assign numerical values to 
these ratings, aggregate over all the principles, and standardize the sum to obtain an index 
that varies from zero to one. Since we are also interested in differentiating among the various 
dimensions of regulation and supervision, we compute compliance indexes for subgroups of 
principles following the grouping by chapters used by the Basel Committee (See Table 1 and 
Appendix 1). Compliance for each chapter is used as an alternative variable of interest.  
The first set of control variables includes various bank characteristics that might 
affect financial strength: size, measured by the logarithm of bank assets; profitability, 
                                                 
7 The four categories are compliant, largely compliant, materially non-compliant, and non-compliant.  - 9 - 
 
measured alternatively as return on assets or return on equity; and capitalization, measured 
by the ratio of equity to total assets. We also use the ratio of bank loans to total assets and the 
ratio of deposit to total liabilities to control for the type of intermediation and funding 
sources of each bank. Finally, we control for whether the bank is owned by the government 
or by foreigners and for whether the bank is not a commercial bank.
8  
A  second group of control variables captures the overall quality of the institutions. 
Combining information from a variety of available indexes, Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2003) create various broad measures of perception of institutional quality which have been 
widely used in empirical studies. In our baseline specification, we use an index capturing the 
extent to which the rule of law is respected. This index is strongly correlated with other 
institutional indexes from the same source, such as lack of corruption, contract enforcement, 
etc., and we obtain similar results using these alternative indexes or an average of all the 
indexes. As alternative control for the overall quality of institutions we use GDP per capita.  
Bank soundness is also affected by the macroeconomic outlook, as slow output 
growth, high inflation, a depreciating currency, high real interest rates, and rapid credit 
expansion have been found to be associated with bank instability (see, for instance, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Thus, as a third set of controls, we employ various 
combination of these macroeconomic variables in alternative specifications.  We also use 
S&P’s sovereign rating as a comprehensive indicator of the quality of macroeconomic 
policies and institutions which might affect bank stability in a country. 
 
                                                 
8 The sample includes a few mutual banks, investment houses, and similar institutions. Excluding non-
commercial banks does not change the results. - 10 - 
 
Sample and Data Sources 
BCP compliance data come from assessments carried out by the IMF and the World 
Bank beginning in 1999. Some of these assessments are public information and can be found 
on the institutions’ websites. Others are kept confidential at the request of the country 
authorities. Moody’s financial strength ratings have been compiled from Bankscope 
database. Bankscope reports the current rating, the last date in which the rating was revised, 
and the rating that prevailed before then, but no other historical rating information. Since we 
need to roughly match the timing of the BCP rating with that of Moody’s ratings, we dropped 
from the sample banks that had a rating change after more than one year since the BCP 
compliance evaluation. Only a few banks fall in this category. 
Bank-level variables have also been constructed from Bankscope, while 
macroeconomic variables are mainly from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  
Information about bank ownership is obtained from Bankscope and other miscellaneous 
sources. Banks are considered state-owned if the government has a controlling share or is the 
sole owner, and similarly for foreign-owned banks. Detailed variable definitions and sources 
are reported in Table 1 in the Appendix. 
We use BCP assessment data for 39 countries for which we have bank ratings from 
Moody’s.
9  Not surprisingly, this group includes mostly developed countries and emerging 
markets, while low-income countries are not represented (Table 2). Some countries have only 
one or two banks in the sample, but since we are not relying on intra-country variation to 
                                                 
9 The BCP assessment data covers 67 countries, but only 39 of these countries have banks large enough to 
receive a rating from Moody’s. - 11 - 
 
identify the relationship of interest this should not be a major limitation. The total number of 
banks in the baseline sample is 203.  
 
A First Look at the Data  
Figure 1 shows the overall compliance index by region and level of development. As 
expected, advanced countries have the highest compliance. Among the other countries, East 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are closer to meeting the Basel standards, while South Asia, the 
Middle East and North Africa and Latin America lag behind. If we examine subgroups of 
chapters, the highest compliance is with principles concerning the licensing of banks and the 
structure of the banking market (Figure 2). At the other extreme, principles regarding the 
formal powers of supervisors were implemented to the least degree. Differences in 
compliance are not very large across different categories of principles, but averages across 
countries may hide larger discrepancies within each country. 
Table 3 presents correlations about compliance levels in different subgroups of 
chapters.  Compliance levels are all significantly and positively correlated. The strongest 
correlation (over 80 percent) is between compliance with principles concerning prudential 
regulation and those concerning methods of ongoing supervision. Other correlations are 
considerably weaker, even falling below 50 percent in the case of principles regarding the 
formal powers of supervisors. All in all, these correlations suggest that there is enough 
variation in compliance across chapters to investigate the effect of various aspects of 
supervision separately.  
Turning now to bank ratings, Table 4 presents correlations between ratings and bank 
level variables. There is a strong positive correlation between bank size and bank soundness, - 12 - 
 
as larger, better diversified banks are seen as more stable. This correlation may be partly 
driven by the fact that larger banks tend to be located in more advanced countries, which 
have more stable economies. More profitable and better capitalized banks with a lower ratio 
of loans to assets also receive higher ratings. State banks are seen as more vulnerable, while 
the presence of large liquid assets is associated with a less favorable rating. This may reflect 
the existence of high compulsory liquidity requirements or lack of opportunities to lend in 
some unstable emerging markets.  Interestingly, foreign-owned banks do not receive 
significantly higher ratings. 
Among country level variables (Table 5), bank ratings have a strong positive 
correlation with the country sovereign rating, the index of rule of law, and GDP per capita. 
Rapid exchange rate depreciation is associated with lower ratings. The correlation with the 
variable of interest, compliance with the BCPs, is positive, large, and significant.   
 
4. The Results 
Results Using the Aggregate Index and Their Robustness 
Regressions of bank financial strength ratings on the overall index of BCP 
compliance are in Table 6. The index enters the regressions positively and significantly both 
by itself and when bank characteristics are controlled for. Controlling for institutional 
development with GDP per capita does not alter the relationship, while when we control for 
the sovereign rating the coefficient of compliance becomes smaller and statistical 
significance drops from one percent to five percent. When the quality of institutions is 
controlled for through the rule of law index, the coefficient of compliance becomes even 
smaller and significance drops to ten percent, suggesting that rule of law is an important - 13 - 
 
control variable. We take the specification including rule of law as the baseline in the rest of 
the paper.
10 
Excluding advanced country banks from the sample does not change regression 
results much. However, when we exclude extreme observations, the coefficient of 
compliance becomes quite small and is no longer significant. Significance also disappears if 
we estimate the model using OLS instead of ordered probit.
11  
As far as the control variables, larger banks are rated significantly higher and state-
owned banks are considered more vulnerable. Foreign-owned banks are also rated more 
favorably and the coefficient is significant in the specification that includes the overall 
institutional quality of the country, but not if we restrict the sample to developing countries.
12 
These results suggest that once we control for bank size, ownership, and institutions, the 
additional explanatory power of bank balance sheet variables is small. 
We conclude that while there is a positive correlation between bank soundness and 
the overall index of BCP compliance, this result is sensitive to controlling for the institutional 
quality of the country and to the exclusion of outliers. An interesting question is whether 
different principles that make up the overall BCP index affect bank soundness differently.  
We turn to this issue next. 
 
                                                 
10 Using an average of the Kaufman et al. (2003) institutional indexes rather than rule of law does not change 
any of the results. 
11 Extreme observations are identified by dropping the top one percent from the top and bottom of the 
distribution of each of the five bank characteristics. This results in a loss of about ten percent of the 
observations. 
12 The baseline specification excludes liquidity variables to preserve sample size. However including liquidity 
throughout does not change the results.  - 14 - 
 
Results by Group of Principles 
In Table 7 we investigate the impact of different core principles as summarized by the 
seven chapters by including them in our baseline specification one at a time. Our results 
indicate that principles related to licensing and structure (Chapter 2) and information 
requirements (Chapter 5) are the most significantly associated with higher bank ratings at one 
percent significance. At the ten percent level, preconditions for effective bank supervision 
(Chapter 1) also enter significantly. 
To check if these results are robust we control for compliance with the rest of the 
principles. Thus we create three aggregate indexes excluding Chapters 1, 2, and 5 
respectively. When we include these aggregate indexes in the relevant regressions, we see 
that only compliance with information requirements (Chapter 5) remains significant. As an 
additional robustness test, we re-run these three specifications excluding individual countries 
one by one.  The last three columns of Table 7 report the regressions that result in the largest 
standard error for the compliance variable of interest.  The results show that Chapter 5, the 
principle measuring compliance with transparency, is the only principle that remains 
significantly associated with bank soundness.     
Assessing the magnitude of the effect of Chapter 5 compliance on ratings is 
somewhat complicated by the fact that the econometric model is non-linear and that the 
compliance indicator is discrete. Nonetheless, computing marginal effects at the sample 
mean of the regressors, and assuming a constant elasticity around the mean, a decline in 
compliance from largely compliant to materially non-compliant would lower by one notch 
the rating of a bank rated D (from D to D-).       
 - 15 - 
 
Robustness of the Relationship Between Bank Ratings and Compliance with Information 
Provision   
In this section we conduct additional robustness checks on the empirical relationship 
between information disclosure and bank soundness and investigate reverse causality.  
Compliance with Chapter 5 of the BCPs is positively and significantly associated 
with bank ratings also when we exclude from the sample advanced countries or extreme 
observations. In further robustness tests, we add to the baseline regression additional 
macroeconomic controls, which have been found in the literature to be associated with bank 
fragility (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998 and 2005): depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate, the inflation rate and its standard deviation, real credit growth, real GDP per 
capita growth.
13 Among the macro variables, exchange rate depreciation and inflation 
volatility are negatively and significantly associated with bank ratings, while the level of 
inflation, real GDP growth, and real credit growth are not significant (results not reported) . 
Compliance with information requirements remains significant and positive throughout these 
different specifications, confirming that the impact of this principle is not sensitive to omitted 
macro controls. 
In yet another specification, we include in the regressions two measures of the 
frequency and timeliness of macroeconomic data release obtained from IMF’s Special Data 
Dissemination Standards (Allum and Agça, 2001). These measures might help us control for 
unobservable characteristics that make a country more transparent. The frequency index is 
positive and significant, while the timeliness is not (result not reported). More importantly, 
compliance with chapter 5 remains significant and positive also in these regressions.  
                                                 
13 For detailed variable definitions and sources see Appendix Table 1. - 16 - 
 
In the last set of regressions, we try to separate out compliance with Chapter 5 from 
other design features of supervision and regulation by introducing as regressors four indexes 
constructed using BCL’s survey of bank regulators.  Specifically, these indexes measure the 
presence in the laws and regulations of various provisions related to discipline, information 
disclosure, auditing requirements, and lack of banking restrictions (Barth, Caprio, Levine, 
2001).  Among the BCL variables, only the disclosure index has a significant impact on 
ratings once compliance with Chapter 5 is controlled for.  Surprisingly, however, its 
coefficient is negative, perhaps suggesting that having many disclosure requirements but not 
enforcing them is detrimental to bank soundness.  
 
Endogeneity of BCP Compliance 
In this paper, we use individual bank level information to test the impact of 
compliance with the BCPs. Since an individual bank’s soundness rating is unlikely to have 
an impact on country-level measures of supervisory quality, reverse causality should not be a 
serious concern. However, soundness ratings are correlated within countries, so it is possible 
that assessors may assign better compliance ratings to countries whose large banks are 
generally considered to be financially sound. Furthermore, since the level of compliance is a 
policy choice made by the countries themselves, countries with sounder banks may face less 
political opposition in adopting more rigorous regulatory and supervisory processes 
compared to those countries with distressed banks.  On the other hand, it can also be argued 
that countries with weak banks coming out of a financial crisis may have the strongest 
incentives and political support to reform their regulations and supervision. So in principle 
the endogeneity of supervision may bias the relationship with soundness in either direction. - 17 - 
 
It should be emphasized that endogeneity concerns should not be overblown, 
particularly because we are examining only one of the chapters and using compliance with 
the other chapters as a control variable. Thus, the index of compliance with all but Chapter 5 
should work as a comprehensive control for unobserved country characteristics or shocks that 
make the country more likely to comply with BCLs. It is only factors specific to compliance 
with information disclosure that remain to be controlled for.   
To deal with the potential endogeneity of compliance with Chapter 5, we use 
instrumental variables estimation. In estimation we apply a two stage least squares technique.  
We follow the established practice in the literature on institutions and use legal origin 
dummy variables as instruments.
14 The idea is that fundamental historical country 
characteristics, such as legal origin, affect a country’s institutions, and thus have a bearing on 
the particular institutions of bank regulation and supervision. On the other hand, bank 
soundness is unlikely to be affected by these historical characteristics, particularly after 
controlling for broad institutional quality and supervision itself. 
The 2SLS estimation results are in Table 9. First, legal origin variables are jointly 
highly significant in the first stage regressions. In all specifications the F-test for the joint 
significance of the instruments is well above 10, suggesting that there is no concern about 
weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005). In the second stage, compliance with information 
provision remains positive and significant in all specification. Following Moreira (2003), we 
have also computed CLR confidence intervals, which should be robust to weak instruments. 
Also based on these confidence intervals compliance with Chapter 5 has a positive effect on 
                                                 
14 See Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2003) for a discussion of alternative instruments of financial 
institution development.        
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bank ratings. Using religion as an alternative instrument gives similar results. On the other 
hand, other basic country characteristics, such as latitude or ethnic fractionalization, have 
poor predictive power for BCP compliance.
15  
 
Measuring Bank Soundness with Z-Scores  
  As discussed in the introduction, Moody’s ratings are a nice measure of bank 
financial strength, as they are prepared by specialists with access to variety of sources of 
information and whose business is to make accurate assessments. On the other hand, ratings 
are subjective, and it may be argued that analysts may be better disposed towards bank that 
provide more accurate and timely information even though these banks are not necessarily 
more sound. To address this concern, in this section we measure bank soundness using an 
alternative, objective, and commonly used indicator, namely the Z-score.
16 We compute Z-
scores for the banks in our sample and investigate if we continue to find evidence that 
compliance with information requirements is a significant correlate to bank soundness. 
  The specification is broadly similar to the previous baseline, although we dropped 
equity and return on assets from the set of regressors since these variables are now used to 
compute the left-hand-side variable. The z-scores have a positive and statistically significant 
correlation with Moody’s ratings, but the correlation is not very high (about 20 percent). 
Nonetheless, the relationship between bank soundness and BCP compliance remains 
                                                 
15 Barth et al. (2004) use religion and latitude as instruments for bank supervision.  
16 The Z-score is defined as  (average return on assets +equity/assets)/(standard deviation of the return on 
assets). It can be interpreted as the number of standard deviations below the mean by which returns would have 
to fall to wipe out bank equity (see Boyd and Runkle, 1993). In the regressions, we use as the dependent 
variable ln (1+ Z-score).    - 19 - 
 
remarkably similar to the one uncovered using Moody’s ratings (Table 10): the overall 
compliance index is positive but not significant, and when we examine individual chapters 
the only one that is robust is Chapter 5 on information provision. Additional tests using more 
macroeconomic control variables (exchange rate depreciation, inflation, inflation volatility, 
credit growth) confirm this finding (results not reported). 
  To summarize, the positive relationship between compliance with information 
provision regulation is in evidence whether bank soundness is measured through Moody’s 
ratings or through Z-scores.  
 
5. Conclusions  
  Strong regulation and supervision plays an essential part in ensuring a safe and sound 
banking system. To curb bank fragility and improve crisis management, many countries are 
in the process of strengthening their regulatory and supervisory systems, a complicated and 
costly process for many developing countries where human resources are scarce and other 
supporting institutions are weak. What type of regulations and supervisory practices are most 
effective in ensuring bank soundness?  This is the question that we have addressed in this 
study. 
 Using  bank-level  investor  ratings for 39 countries, we study whether compliance with 
Basel Core Principles (BCPs), the standard of best practices in bank supervision, is 
associated with bank soundness. BCP compliance assessments, carried out under the auspices 
of the World Bank and IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program, provide a unique source 
of information about the quality of bank supervision and regulation around the world.  - 20 - 
 
An important aspect of our study is the attempt to differentiate among different 
elements of the regulatory framework, to help prioritize reform efforts. We find a significant 
and positive relationship between compliance with information provision and bank 
soundness, which is robust to controlling broad indexes of institutional quality, 
macroeconomic variables, sovereign ratings, as well as reverse causality. Specifically, 
countries which require their banks to report regularly and accurately their financial data to 
regulators and market participants have more highly rated banks, as timely disclosure of high 
quality information strengthens monitoring by regulators and markets alike.  
Our results also suggest that countries aiming to upgrade banking regulation and 
supervision should consider giving priority to information provision over other elements of 
the Core Principles. Because information provision is a necessary condition for effective 
discipline, this policy recommendation is consistent with the approach to regulation and 
supervision recommended by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006), who stress the importance of 
mechanisms to empower market discipline and are skeptical of structures that assign too 
much power to regulators.   
 - 21 - 
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Table 1. Basel Core Principles—Definitions 
 
 
Chapter 1: Preconditions for effective banking 
supervision       
           
Principle 1. Objectives, autonomy, powers, and resources            
           
Principle 1(1). There should be clear responsibilities and objectives set by legislations for each supervisory agency. 
Principle 1(2). Each supervisory agency should possess adequate resources to meet the objective set, provided 
on terms that do not undermine the autonomy, integrity and independence of supervisory agency. 
Principle 1(3).  A suitable framework of banking laws, setting bank minimum standard, including provisions related to 
authorization of banking establishments and their supervision. 
Principle 1(4). The legal framework should provide power to address compliance with laws as well as safety and 
soundness concerns. 
Principle 1(5). The legal framework should provide protection of supervisors for actions taken in good faith in the 
course of performing supervisory duties. 
Principle 1(6). There should be arrangements of interagency cooperation, including with foreign supervisors, for sharing 
information and protecting the confidentiality of such information. 
           
Chapter 2: Licensing and Structure         
           
Principle  2.  Definition  of  permissible  activities        
Principle 3. Right to set licensing criteria and reject applications for establishments that do meet the standard sets 
Principle 4. Authority to review and reject proposals of significant ownership changes     
Principle 5. Authority to establish criteria for reviewing major acquisitions or investments     
           
Chapter 3: Prudential Regulations and Requirements       
           
Principle 6. Prudent and appropriate risk adjusted capital adequacy ratios must be set.     
Principle 7. Supervisors should evaluate  banks'  credit  policies.      
Principle 8. Banks should adhere to adequate loan evaluation and loan-loss provisioning policies.   
Principle 9. Supervisors should set limits to restrict large exposures, and concentration in bank portfolios should be 
identifiable. 
Principle 10. Supervisors must have in place requirements to mitigate the risks associated with related lending. 
Principle 11. Policies must be in place to identify, monitor and control country risks, and to maintain reserves against 
such risks. 
Principle 12. Systems must be in place to accurately measure, monitor and adequately control markets risks 
and supervisors should have powers to impose limits or capital charge on such exposures.     
Principle 13. Banks must have in place a comprehensive risk management process to identify, measure, monitor and 
control all other material risks and, if needed, hold capital against such risks. 
Principle 14. Banks should have internal control and audit systems in place.       
Principle 15. Adequate policies, practices and procedures should be in place to promote high ethical and professional  
standards and prevent the bank being used by criminal elements.         
           
Chapter 4: Methods of On-Going Supervision        
           
Principle 16. An effective supervisory system should consist of on-site and off-site supervision.   
Principle 17. Supervisors should have regular contact with bank management.       
Principle 18. Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analyzing prudential reports and statistics 
returns from banks on a solo and consolidated basis. - 24 - 
 
Principle 19. Supervisors must have a means of independent validation of supervisory information either through  
on-site examinations or use of external auditors.           
Principle 20. Supervisors must have the ability to supervise banking groups on a consolidated basis.   
           
Chapter 5: Information Requirements       
           
Principle 21. Each bank must maintain adequate records that enable the supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of the 
financial condition of the bank of the bank, and must publish on a regular basis financial statements that fairly reflects 
its condition. 
           
Chapter 6: Formal Powers of Supervisors        
           
Principle 22. Adequate supervisory measures must be in place to bring about corrective action when banks fail to meet 
prudential requirements, when there are regulatory violations, or when depositors are threatened in any other way. 
This should include the ability to revoke the banking license or recommend its revocation. 
           
Chapter 7: Cross-Border Banking         
           
Principle 23. Supervisors must practice global consolidated supervision over internationally active banks, adequately 
monitor and apply prudential norms to all aspects of the business conducted by these banks. 
Principle 24. Consolidated supervision should include establishing contact and information exchange with the various 
supervisors involved, primarily host country supervisory authorities. 
Principle 25. Supervisors must require the local operations of foreign banks to be conducted at the same standards  as 
required of domestic institutions, and must have powers to share information needed by the home country supervisors of 
those banks. 
           
           
Source: Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Basle, Sept. 1997 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (by county) 
Countries 
Sovereign 
Rating  Rule of Law  Growth  Depreciation  ROAA ROAE NLTA ETA LogTA 
     
GDP 
per 
capita          
Av. 
Bank 








BAHRAIN 0.56  10591  0.86  0.01  0.00  0.44 1.5 14.2  37.4  10.3  16.3 3  0  1 
BRAZIL 0.19  4580  -0.19  0.01  0.20  0.37 2.1 24.6  27.1  8.9  15.2 10  4  2 
BULGARIA 0.38  1541  -0.09  0.04  0.88  0.25 1.6 14.2  52.4  12.2  12.0 4  1  0 
CANADA 1.00  22745  1.89  0.03  0.02  0.67  0.5 9.4  54.3  5.3  17.0 3  0  0 
COLOMBIA 0.31  2278  -0.63  0.01  0.11  0.36 -0.2 -4.3  56.0  14.5  7.4  3  1  0 
CROATIA 0.44  5023  -0.07  0.04  0.10  0.40 1.1 11.8  35.0  7.9  13.3 1  0  0 
CZECH REP.  0.75  5387  0.64  0.00  0.08  0.37 1.1 14.9  38.1  7.2  11.5 2  2  0 
EGYPT 0.38  1211  0.18  0.03  0.00  0.32  0.8 12.8  51.4  5.5  14.5 6  1  5 
ESTONIA 0.75  3787  0.60  0.06  0.08  0.44 2.3 16.9  59.3  12.5  11.2 3  2  0 
FINLAND 1.00  31222  2.04  0.03  .  0.67  0.5 10.8  59.0  4.6  16.1 3  0  0 
FRANCE 1.00  29935  1.46  0.02  .  0.64  0.5 8.0  32.3  5.6  17.4  14  1  0 
HONG KONG  0.75  24483  1.58  0.02  0.00  0.45  1.2 11.7  51.6  11.0  13.6 5  0  0 
HUNGARY 0.75  5368  0.79  0.04  0.13  0.49  2.8 21.9  51.3  14.3  9.6  3  1  0 
INDIA 0.44  465  0.13  0.04  0.09  0.33  0.9 17.7  45.9  5.2  12.7 5  0  4 
INDONESIA 0.13  1010  -0.75  0.02  0.34  0.22 -1.4 28.5  29.5  9.4  6.7  5  0  1 
IRELAND 1.00  27466  1.77  0.08  .  0.47  0.3 6.6  20.4  3.6  15.3 4  0  0 
ISRAEL 0.69  17254  1.06  0.01  0.06  0.48  0.4 6.1  57.6  5.9  15.5 5  0  2 
JAPAN 1.00  44459  1.62  0.01  0.02  0.30  -0.3 -16.8  65.0  4.6  13.0 23  0  1 
KAZAKHSTAN 0.44  1552  -0.79  0.06  0.18  0.24 2.0 16.3  57.9  10.9  8.0  9  0  0 
KOREA REP. OF  0.63  12962  0.78  0.04  0.08 0.29  0.4  6.0  64.3  4.8  10.1  7 0  1 
KUWAIT 0.69  12392  0.94  -0.03  0.01  0.44 1.9 18.0  39.9  12.3  16.9 6  1  0 
LATVIA 0.69  2620  0.24  0.07  0.02  0.33 1.2 12.6  61.7  9.6  13.8 2  0  1 
MAURITIUS 0.50  4198  0.85  0.04  0.08  0.37 2.2 19.9  70.3  11.2  10.9 2  0  0 
MEXICO 0.56  3720  -0.27  0.04  0.08  0.47 0.6  8.3  62.8  8.8  14.9 3  1  0 
MOROCCO 0.38  1394  0.29  0.02  0.05  0.42 1.0  9.3  50.1  10.6  12.5 3  1  0 
PERU 0.25  2314  -0.43  0.02  0.09  0.33 0.3  3.3  52.1  9.7  13.9 2  1  0 
PHILIPPINES 0.19  1163  -0.29  0.01  0.12  0.29 1.4 25.5  49.7  11.4  11.3 6  0  2 
POLAND 0.69  3643  0.57  0.04  0.08  0.28  -0.8 -18.2  54.6  8.5  13.9  7  2  1 
RUSSIAN FED.  0.44  2905  -0.80  0.04  0.50 0.21  1.8  13.7  48.9  17.0  10.7  11  0  2 
SLOVAKIA 0.69  4293  0.24  0.04  0.09  0.33  0.5 16.3  29.5  5.8  10.4 2  2  0 
SLOVENIA 0.81  11641  0.84  0.04 0.14 0.43  -1.1  -12.3  44.6  9.9  8.8  2 1  1 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.56  3913  0.26  0.00  0.14  0.53 1.0 15.3  72.9  5.2  14.5 2  1  0 
SWEDEN 1.00  32523  1.94  0.03  0.01  0.73  -0.1 -1.5  43.6  4.6  15.7 1  0  0 - 26 - 
 
THAILAND 0.56  2805  0.40  0.01 0.10 0.26  -1.2  -46.0  67.0  4.5  12.6  7 1  0 
TUNISIA 0.50  2472  0.31  0.03  0.05  0.29 1.3 14.1  67.1  9.3  13.9 5  1  1 
TURKEY 0.19  2903  0.07  0.00  0.72  0.36  0.3 -2.8  29.8  12.3  15.5 8  1  0 
UKRAINE  0.19 891 -0.72 0.04 0.26  0.20 1.5 15.9  55.1  8.6  12.1 1  0  0 
UNITED ARAB EM.  0.75  18409  1.10  0.01  0.00 0.47  2.5  16.2  64.4  15.8  14.0  4 0  2 
U.K. 1.00  22164  1.91  0.03  0.01  0.63  0.7 11.9  58.3  7.0  16.6 13  2  0 
Average/ total  0.63  13843  0.63  0.02  0.15 0.39  0.8  6.1  50.9  8.6  13.4  205  28  27 - 27 - 
 
 
Table 3. Correlations between BCP chapters 























                
Overall Index  1.00               
                
0.77 1.00              Preconditions 
effective supervision  0.00             
               
0.78 0.65  1.00            Licensing and 
structure  0.00 0.00             
              
0.94 0.64  0.71  1.00          Prudential regulations 
and requirements  0.00 0.00  0.00           
              
0.90 0.60  0.63  0.84  1.00        Methods of on-going 
supervision  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00         
              
Information 
requirements  0.77 0.61  0.58  0.67  0.77 1.00     
  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00       
              
0.61 0.57  0.47  0.51  0.46 0.43 1.00    Formal powers of 
supervisors  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00     
              
0.83 0.71  0.64  0.69  0.69 0.64 0.48  1.00  Cross-border banking 
0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00   
                          
Note:  p values in italics            - 28 - 
 
Table 4. Correlations among bank characteristics 
                          
                
  Bank  rating  ROAA ROAE NLTA ETA logTA 





                          
                
Bank rating  1.00               
                
                
Return on assets  0.04  1.00             
 0.54               
               
Return on equity  0.16  0.77  1.00           
 0.02  0.00             
               
Net loans-to-assets  -0.22  -0.16  -0.23  1.00         
  0.00 0.02  0.00         
                
Capitalization -0.14  0.41  0.20  -0.18  1.00       
  0.04 0.00  0.00  0.01        
                
Total assets (logs)  0.63  -0.02  0.01  -0.23 
-
0.30 1.00     
 0.00  0.73  0.86  0.00  0.00       
                
Foreign owned  0.05  -0.05  -0.02  -0.04  0.04  -0.05  1.00   
 0.50  0.52  0.78  0.56  0.59  0.45     
                
State owned  -0.19  0.03  0.07  -0.02 
-
0.07 0.01  -0.16  1.00 
 0.01  0.68  0.29  0.82  0.35  0.87  0.03   
                          
                
Note: p-values are in italics             
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Av. bank rating  1.00                         
Country  rating 0.69  1.00                   
  0.00                    
BCP  Index  0.58  0.52  1.00                  
  0.00  0.00                   
Rule of Law  0.76  0.89  0.60  1.00                   
  0.00  0.00  0.00                  
GDP  per  capita 0.63  0.80  0.56  0.85  1.00              
  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00                 
Depreciation  -0.43 -0.51 -0.14 -0.49 -0.35  1.00               
  0.01  0.00  0.40  0.00  0.03              
Growth -0.05  0.20  0.19  0.00  -0.06  -0.04  1.00             
  0.77  0.21  0.25  0.99  0.73  0.84            
Percent foreign 
owned  -0.04 -0.02 -0.26 -0.17 -0.32  -0.04  -0.07 1.00           
 0.81  0.91  0.11  0.30  0.04  0.82  0.68             
Percent state owned  -0.21  -0.19  0.16  -0.14  -0.20  -0.13  0.03  -0.21  1.00         
 0.20  0.25  0.32  0.41  0.23  0.46  0.87  0.19           
Lack restrictions 
(BCL) 0.30  0.18  0.35  0.22  0.19  0.10  0.05  -0.13  -0.19  1.00       
 0.06  0.28  0.03  0.17  0.23  0.54  0.76  0.43  0.25         
Auditing (BCL)  0.21  0.07  0.16  0.08  0.04  -0.13  0.09  0.22  -0.10  -0.03  1.00     
 0.19  0.69  0.33  0.61  0.82  0.43  0.58  0.19  0.54  0.88       
Disclosure (BCL)  0.33  0.39  0.42  0.48  0.35  -0.35  -0.01  0.04  -0.02  0.52  0.26  1.00   
 0.04  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.04  0.95  0.81  0.91  0.00  0.11     
Discipline  (BCL)  -0.24 -0.16 -0.05 -0.15 -0.23  -0.25  0.09 0.08 0.18  0.03  0.14  0.39  1.00 
 0.15  0.34  0.76  0.35  0.15  0.15  0.57  0.62  0.26  0.84  0.41  0.01   
                     
Note: p-values are in italics                    - 30 - 
 
 
Table 6: Impact of overall index of compliance with BCPs on bank ratings 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
                
Baseline LDCs  Tails 
excluded  
Index of compliance 
with BCPs  4.927 4.259 4.363 4.125 2.626 2.805 2.824 1.647 1.448  1.855  0.686  0.14 
 [7.38]***  [4.94]***  [5.18]***  [4.98]***  [3.10]***  [3.41]***  [2.94]*** [2.01]**  [1.66]*  [1.75]*  [0.69]  [1.48] 
Foreign-owned 0.32  0.252  0.261  0.261  0.286 0.277 0.25  0.381  0.406 0.308 0.433  0.036 
 [1.65]*  [1.30]  [1.31]  [1.35]  [1.50]  [1.43]  [1.49] [2.33]**  [2.48]**  [1.59]  [2.50]**  [1.87]* 
State-owned -0.658  -0.721  -0.702  -0.709  -0.724  -0.677 -0.772  -0.505 -0.515 -0.521 -0.499  -0.065 
 [2.95]***  [2.96]***  [2.90]***  [2.71]***  [2.77]***  [2.54]**  [2.63]*** [2.09]**  [2.02]**  [1.96]*  [1.98]**  [2.58]** 
Other banking 
institutions 0.296  0.389  0.392  0.377  0.293 0.284 0.338  0.073 0.14  0.069 0.123  0.022 
 [2.02]**  [2.34]**  [2.38]**  [2.07]**  [1.50]  [1.49]  [1.50] [0.36] [0.71]  [0.21]  [0.65]  [0.91] 
Return on equity    0.005  0.005  0.005 0.006    0.006  0.008  0.008 0.001 0.014  0.001 
   [0.91]  [0.87]  [0.89]  [1.22]    [1.34] [1.55] [1.59]  [0.32]  [2.62]***  [1.65] 
Capitalization     0.011  -0.01  0.013 0.018 0.01  0.028  0.032 0.029 0.026  0.002 
     [1.15]  [0.35]  [0.53]  [0.65]  [0.46] [1.13] [1.52]  [1.03]  [1.27]  [1.12] 
Net loans-to-assets        -0.007  -0.002  -0.003 -0.001  -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006  -0.001 
       [1.08]  [0.26]  [0.50]  [0.21]  [1.06] [1.06]  [0.74]  [0.98]  [0.93] 
Total assets          0.214  0.205 0.213  0.216 0.188 0.074 0.165  0.022 
         [3.81]***  [3.81]***  [3.80]***  [4.07]*** [3.14]***  [1.28]  [2.82]***  [2.90]*** 
Return on assets            0.017              
        [0.32]             
GDP per capita              -3.4E-06            
         [0.31]           
Index of sovereign 
rating          1.284          
          [1.90]*          
Index of Rule of Law                  0.509  0.883  0.568  0.056 
                 [1.97]**  [3.28]***  [2.14]**  [2.15]** 
Observations 260  206  206  203  203  203  203  205  203  132  180  203 
Pseudo R2 or R2  0.12  0.1  0.11  0.11  0.15 0.15 0.15  0.18  0.17 0.12 0.15  0.55 
























Robust z statistics in brackets, observations are clustered by country. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. - 31 - 
 
Table 7. Impact of individual chapters 
           Dropping countries one by one 
1/ 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
Foreign-owned 0.427  0.309  0.409  0.394 0.38 0.397  0.403 0.449 0.186 0.295 
 [2.65]***  [1.94]*  [2.24]**  [2.52]**  [2.80]***  [2.63]*** [2.37]**  [2.37]**  [1.03]  [1.8]* 
State-owned -0.52  -0.575  -0.443  -0.381  -0.673 -0.406 -0.447 -0.498  -0.639 -0.691 
 [2.07]**  [2.07]**  [1.82]*  [1.51]  [2.35]**  [1.64] [1.75]*  [-1.86]*  [-2.16]**  [-2.14]** 
Other banking 
institutions 0.105  0.234  0.099  0.083 0.252 0.093 0.124 0.077  0.296 0.340 
 [0.56]  [1.29]  [0.50]  [0.41]  [1.25] [0.45] [0.62]  [0.4]  [1.64] [1.51] 
Return on equity  0.008  0.008  0.013 0.01 0.007 0.01 0.009 0.013 0.002 0.002 
 [1.57]  [1.58]  [1.83]*  [1.91]*  [1.40]  [1.99]** [1.82]*  [1.73]*  [0.31]  [0.56] 
Capitalization -0.005  -0.006  -0.006  -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 -0.004  -0.001  0.560 
 [1.00]  [1.01]  [0.98]  [1.38]  [1.61]  [1.39] [0.95] [-0.63] [-0.14]  [-0.77  ] 
Net loans-to-assets  0.03  0.036  0.03  0.035 0.028 0.038 0.039 0.027  0.013 0.013 
 [1.42]  [1.60]  [1.39]  [1.60]  [1.52]  [1.70]* [1.86]*  [1.26]  [0.54]  [0.64] 
Total assets  0.2  0.211  0.195  0.221 0.212 0.205 0.206 0.210  0.184 0.184 
 [3.47]***  [3.74]***  [3.04]***  [3.22]***  [3.59]***  [3.38]*** [3.52]*** [3.34]***  [2.65]*** [2.85]*** 
Index of Rule of 
Law  0.551 0.5  0.603  0.724  0.434  0.744 0.576 0.575  0.939 0.858 
 [2.26]**  [2.03]**  [2.25]**  [3.68]***  [1.79]* [4.05]***  [2.28]** [2.21]** [4.05}*** 
[ 
3.85]*** 
Index chapter 1  1.14              1.379     
  [1.73]*         [1.07]    
Index chapter 2    2.538              1.491   
    [3.71]***         [1.39]   
Index chapter 3      0.568               
      [0.56]          
Index chapter 4        -0.632             
       [0.59]             
Index chapter 5          2.037          1.573 
         [3.17]***          [2.13]** 
Index chapter 6            -0.509         
           [0.90]         
Index chapter 7              0.682       
          [1.31]      
Av. chapters, excl. 
cha. 1            -0.399    
           [-0.26]    
Av. chapters, excl. 
cha. 2                   0.116   
            [0.07]   
Av. chapters, excl. 
cha. 5               0.326 
              [0.33] 
Observations  203  203 189 203 203 203 203 186  166 175 
























  1/  regression with the largest standard error for the variable of interest.  
Robust z statistics in brackets, observations are clustered by country. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   - 32 - 
 
Table 8. Impact of information requirements (Chapter 5) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
    No  tails  LDCs  OLS         
Compliance  with    ch.  5    2.108 2.128 2.089 0.187 2.324 2.884 2.326 2.098 2.407 2.053  1.89 
  [2.79]*** [2.86]*** [2.99]***  [2.21]**  [3.42]*** [5.43]*** [3.16]*** [3.13]*** [4.55]***  [2.47]**  [2.36]** 
Foreign  owned  0.384 0.452 0.294 0.032 0.398  0.44  0.315 0.416 0.461 0.382 0.374 
  [2.58]***  [2.70]*** [1.44]  [1.88]* [2.34]**  [2.50]**  [2.18]**  [2.45]**  [2.94]***  [2.54]**  [2.39]** 
State  owned  -0.627 -0.605 -0.521 -0.073 -0.786 -0.585 -0.579 -0.527 -0.568  -0.62  -0.688 
  [2.10]**  [2.09]** [1.64] [2.57]**  [2.40]**  [1.93]* [1.94]* [1.81]*  [2.06]**  [2.09]**  [2.39]** 
Return  on  equity  0.011 0.02 -0.001  0.001 0.01  0.01 0.011  0.011 0.01 0.011  0.011 
  [1.61]  [3.13]***  [0.13]  [1.92]*  [1.29] [1.34] [1.63] [1.59] [1.37] [1.62] [1.55] 
Net  loans-to-assets  -0.009 -0.009 -0.005 -0.001 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 
  [1.53] [1.30] [0.86] [1.15] [1.55] [1.26] [1.59] [1.24] [0.64] [1.48] [1.26] 
Capitalization  0.028 0.025 0.026 0.002  0.04  0.047 0.036 0.037 0.046  0.03  0.043 
  [1.42] [1.45] [1.17] [0.91]  [1.99]**  [2.74]***  [1.73]*  [1.93]*  [2.76]***  [1.48]  [2.20]** 
Total  assets  0.222 0.184  0.12  0.024 0.223 0.198 0.219 0.233 0.272 0.222 0.276 
  [3.62]*** [3.04]***  [1.95]*  [3.46]*** [3.62]*** [3.52]*** [3.62]*** [3.78]*** [4.45]*** [3.58]*** [4.00]*** 
Index  of  Rule  of  Law  0.509 0.597 0.782 0.053 0.375 0.373 0.613 0.561 0.827 0.517 0.507 
  [2.25]** [2.71]***  [3.16]*** [2.21]**  [1.53]  [1.71]*  [2.75]***  [2.60]***  [3.78]*** [2.19]**  [2.19]** 
BCP  Compliance  -0.648 -1.064 -0.686 -0.056 -0.296 -1.268 -0.706 -0.761 -1.044 -0.662  -0.68 
(  excl.  chapter  5)  [0.58] [0.93] [0.64] [0.46] [0.31] [1.44] [0.62] [0.76] [1.12] [0.61] [0.63] 
Inflation       -0.005        
       [ 0 . 6 5 ]         
Inflation  volatility      -0.008        
       [4.83]***        
Depreciation        -0.835       
        [2.72]***       
Macro  data  frequency         0.347      
         [ 2 . 4 6 ] * *       
Discipline  (BCL)         -0.882     
          [ 1 . 4 5 ]      
Disclosure  (BCL)          -2.882    
           [3.71]***    
Auditing(BCL)            0.129   
            [ 0 . 3 4 ]    
Lack  restrictions  (BCL)             -0.916 
             [ 1 . 8 6 ] *  
Observations  189 167 118 189 176 167 189 189 189 189 189 
Pseudo  R2  0.19  0.19  0.15  0.59 0.2 0.19 0.2  0.2 0.22  0.19 0.2 
Robust z statistics in brackets, observations are clustered by country. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.- 33 - 
 
Table 9. Bank ratings and information transparency: instrumental variables regressions (2SLS) 
Second Stage   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Compliance with ch.5   0.623  0.496  0.715  0.536  0.689  0.715 
 [2.86]***  [2.49]**  [3.00]***  [2.37]**  [2.73]***  [2.83]*** 
Foreign owned  0.020  0.019  0.021  0.029 0.021 0.018 
  [0.83]  [0.94]  [0.76]  [1.39] [0.73] [0.61] 
State owned  -0.124  -0.113  -0.116  -0.096 -0.103 -0.138 
 [2.78]***  [3.02]***  [2.43]**  [2.49]**  [2.23]**  [2.62]*** 
Return on equity  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  [0.21]  [0.22]  [0.48]  [0.20] [0.25] [0.49] 
Net loans-to-assets  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  [1.28]  [1.36]  [1.19]  [1.49] [1.45] [1.21] 
Total assets  0.023  0.023  0.017  0.018 0.011 0.023 
 [2.89]***  [2.60]***  [2.02]**  [2.56]**  [1.28]  [2.62]*** 
Capitalization -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.002 0.002 0.003 
  [0.16]  [0.11]  [0.36]  [0.71] [0.72] [0.96] 
Index of Rule of Law  -0.024    -0.044      -0.031 
 [0.69]    [1.15]      [0.84] 
Inflation           0.000 
           [0.31] 
Standard deviation of 
inflation           -0.002 
           [3.64]*** 
Index of sovereign rating        0.103  0.025   
       [1.24]  [0.31]   
Depreciation      -0.092   -0.042  
     [1.24]   [0.44]  
Observations  203  203  181  203 181 190 
R-squared 0.360  0.470  0.200  0.460 0.220 0.340 
Hansen J test  1.260  3.150  2.060  4.360 1.410 0.660 
                 p value  0.740  0.370  0.560  0.230  0.700  0.880 
95 percent confidence 
interval           
CLR




0.714]  [0.725, 0.745]  [0.746, 0.766]  [0.781, 0.804] 
Robust z statistics in brackets, observations are clustered by country 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 
1/   Confidence interval robust to weak instruments 
(Moreira,  2003)         
First  stage  (1)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
(excluded IVs)                   
French legal origin  -0.099  -0.171  -0.050  -0.121 -0.013 -0.063 
 [-1.08]  [-2.08]**  [-0.47]  [-1.18]  [-0.1]  [-0.57] 
German legal origin  -0.215  -0.154  -0.212  -0.193 -0.223 -0.192 
 [-2.1]**  [-1.37]  [-1.91]*  [-1.97]**  [-2.39]**  [-1.63] 
Scandinavian legal origin  0.111  0.132  0.145  0.119 0.136 0.143 
  [1.32]  [1.51]  [1.37]  [1.48] [1.59] [1.42] 
Socialist legal origin   -0.143  -0.232  -0.107  -0.230 -0.191 -0.124 
 [-0.96]  [-1.64]*  [-0.64]  [-1.69]*  [-1.34]  [-0.76] 
Partial R-squared  0.14  0.17 0.11  0.1635  0.14  0.12 
F statistic (excluded IVs)  22.67  21.53  19.34  15.59 13.36 21.45 
                  p value  0  0  0  0  0  0 - 34 - 
 
Table 10. Bank Z-Scores and BCP Compliance 
   (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Foreign  owned  -0.057 -0.013 -0.103  -0.157  -0.027 -0.041  -0.072 -0.142  -0.122 -0.129  -0.095 
  [0.20] [0.05] [0.36]  [0.49]  [0.10]  [0.15]  [0.26]  [0.48] [0.36] [0.42]  [0.33] 
State  owned  0.039 0.027 0.096  0.043  -0.023 -0.066  0.141  0.142 0.016 -0.007 -0.083 
  [0.19] [0.13] [0.42]  [0.19]  [0.12]  [0.35]  [0.61]  [0.59] [0.07] [0.03]  [0.43] 
Non  commercial  bank  0.161 0.112 0.143  0.064  0.188  0.324  0.098  0.121 0.062 0.107  0.346 
  [0.65] [0.45] [0.56]  [0.30]  [0.86]  [1.45]  [0.41]  [0.52] [0.29] [0.56]  [1.52] 
Total  assets  0.064  0.073 0.1  0.095  0.064  0.088 0.106  0.1 0.089  0.082  0.081 
  [1.28]  [1.94]*  [2.56]**  [1.34]  [1.61]  [2.53]**  [3.24]*** [2.62]** [2.66]** [2.24]**  [2.02]* 
Overheads / Total Assets  -10.245  -9.214  -9.171  -10.36  -9.357 -9.261  -7.603 -6.454 -10.344 -9.903  -8.275 
 [2.20]**  [1.88]*  [1.85]*  [1.96]*  [1.92]*  [1.87]*  [1.38]  [1.11]  [2.11]**  [2.05]**  [1.60] 
Index  of  Rule  of  Law  -0.143 -0.073 -0.031 -0.03 -0.275  -0.154  0.005  0.045 -0.039 -0.147  -0.14 
  [0.88] [0.44] [0.22]  [0.20]  [1.59]  [1.20]  [0.03]  [0.31] [0.26] [0.93]  [1.16] 
Compliance  with  BCPs 0.02                  
  [ 1 . 4 8 ]                   
Index  chapter  1    1.65            0.742     
   [2.08]**             [0.68]     
Index  chapter  2     0.796               
     [ 0 . 6 6 ]                
Index  chapter  3      0.169             
      [ 0 . 1 4 ]              
Index  chapter  4        2.137         1.332   
        [2.63]**         [1.53]   
Index  chapter  5          2.014        1.979 
          [3.58]***        [3.66]*** 
Index  chapter  6          0.108      
          [ 0 . 1 9 ]       
Index  chapter  7            0.066     
            [ 0 . 1 2 ]      
Compliance, excl. cha. 1                   -0.158     
                [ 0 . 1 2 ]      
Compliance,  excl.  cha.  4                 -0.43   
                 [ 0 . 4 8 ]    
Compliance,  excl.  cha.  5                  0.192 
                  [ 0 . 2 1 ]  
Observations  160 160 160  146 160  160  160 155 146 146  155 
R-squared  0.16 0.18 0.13  0.14 0.19  0.23  0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15  0.23 




Basle Core Principles -- Information Requirements of Banking Organizations 
 
Principle 21: Banking supervisors must be satisfied that each bank maintains adequate records drawn up in 
accordance with consistent accounting policies and practices that enable the supervisor to obtain a true and 
fair view of the financial condition of the bank and the profitability of its business, and that the bank 
publishes on a regular basis financial statements that fairly reflect its condition. 
For banking supervisors to conduct effective off-site supervision of banks and to evaluate the condition of the local 
banking market, they must receive financial information at regular intervals and this information must be verified 
periodically through on-site examinations or external audits. Banking supervisors must ensure that each bank 
maintains adequate accounting records drawn up in accordance with consistent accounting policies and practices 
that enable the supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of the financial condition of the bank and the profitability of 
its business. In order that the accounts portray a true and fair view, it is essential that assets are recorded at values 
that are realistic and consistent, taking account of current values, where relevant, and that profit reflects what, on a 
net basis, is likely to be received and takes into account likely transfers to loan loss reserves. It is important that 
banks submit information in a format that makes comparisons among banks possible although, for certain purposes, 
data derived from internal management information systems may also be helpful to supervisors. At a minimum, 
periodic reporting should include a bank's balance sheet, contingent liabilities and income statement, with 
supporting details and key risk exposures. Supervisors can be obstructed or misled when banks knowingly or 
recklessly provide false information of material importance to the supervisory process. If a bank provides 
information to the supervisor knowing that it is materially false or misleading, or it does so recklessly, supervisory 
and/or criminal action should be taken against both the individuals involved and the institution. 
 
1. Accounting standards 
In order to ensure that the information submitted by banks is of a comparable nature and its meaning is clear, the 
supervisory agency will need to provide report instructions that clearly establish the accounting standards to be used 
in preparing the reports. These standards should be based on accounting principles and rules that command wide 
international acceptance and be aimed specifically at banking institutions. 
 
2. Scope and frequency of reporting 
The supervisory agency needs to have powers to determine the scope and frequency of reporting to reflect the 
volatility of the business and to enable the agency to track what is happening at individual banks on both a solo and 
consolidated basis, as well as with the banking system as a whole. The supervisors should develop a series of 
informational reports for banks to prepare and submit at regular intervals. While some reports may be filed as often 
as monthly, others may be filed quarterly or annually. In addition, some reports may be "event generated", meaning 
they are filed only if a particular event occurs (e.g. investment in a new affiliate). Supervisors should be sensitive to 
the burden that reporting imposes. Consequently, they may determine that it is not necessary for every bank to file 
every report. Filing status can be based on the organizational structure of the bank, its size, and the types of activities 
it conducts. 
 
3. Confirmation of the accuracy of information submitted 
It is the responsibility of bank management to ensure the accuracy, completeness and timeliness of prudential, 
financial, and other reports submitted to the supervisors. Therefore, bank management must ensure that reports are 
verified and that external auditors determine that the reporting systems in place are adequate and provide reliable 
data. External auditors should express an opinion on the annual accounts and management report supplied to 
shareholders and the general public. Weaknesses in bank auditing standards in a particular country may require that 
banking supervisors become involved in establishing clear guidelines concerning the scope and content of the audit 
program as well as the standards to be used. In extreme cases where supervisors cannot be satisfied with the quality 
of the annual accounts or regulatory reports, or with the work done by external auditors, they should have the ability 
to use supervisory measures to bring about timely corrective action, and they may need to reserve the right to 
approve the issue of accounts to the public. In assessing the nature and adequacy of work done by auditors, and the 
degree of reliance that can be placed on this work, supervisors will need to consider the extent to which the audit 
program has examined such areas as the loan portfolio, loan loss reserves, nonperforming assets (including the 
treatment of interest on such assets), asset valuations, trading and other securities activities, derivatives, asset - 36 - 
 
securitizations, and the adequacy of internal controls over financial reporting. Where it is competent and 
independent of management, internal audits can be relied upon as a source of information and may contribute 
usefully to the supervisors' understanding. 
 
4. Confidentiality of supervisory information 
Although market participants should have access to correct and timely information, there are certain types of 
sensitive information27 that should be held confidential by banking supervisors. In order for a relationship of mutual 
trust to develop, banks need to know that such sensitive information will be held confidential by the banking 
supervisory agency and its appropriate counterparts at other domestic and foreign supervisory agencies.  
 
5. Disclosure 
In order for market forces to work effectively, thereby fostering a stable and efficient financial system, market 
participants need access to correct and timely information. Disclosure, therefore, is a complement to supervision. 
For this reason, banks should be required to disclose to the public information regarding their activities and financial 
position that is comprehensive and not misleading. This information should be timely and sufficient for market 




Variable   Definition  Source 
ROAE  Return over average equity  Bankscope 
ROAA  Return over average assets  Bankscope 
NLTA  Net loans, in percent of total assets   Bankscope 
LogTA  Log of total bank assets  Bankscope 
ETA  Equity in percent of total assets  Bankscope 
LA  Liquid assets / customer and short-term funding   Bankscope 
Index of Rule of Law  Average 1996-2002 of Index of Rule of Law  
Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003)  
Depreciation 
Average annual depreciation of the nominal 
exchange over the previous 5 years 
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics 
Index of sovereign rating  S&P sovereign rating  S&P 
Inflation 
Average annual inflation rate over the previous 5 
years 
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics 
Real credit growth 
Average annual real credit growth over the 
previous 5 years 
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics 
Standard deviation of inflation 
Standard deviation of inflation over the previous 
5 years 
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics 
Real GDP per capita growth 
Average annual real GDP per capita growth over 
the previous 5 years 
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics 
Standard deviation of growth 
Standard deviation of  growth over the previous 5 
years 
IMF, International Financial 
Statistics 
Index of discipline (BCL)  Index of discipline   Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) 
Index of disclosure (BCL) 
Index of information disclosure (Barth, Caprio 
and Levine (2003))  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) 
Index auditing requirements 
(BCL) 
Index of auditing requirements (Barth, Caprio and 
Levine (2003))  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) 
Index lack restrictions (Caprio et 
al.) 
Index of (lack of) overall restrictions (Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2003))  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) 
Index Frequency SDDS 
Index of frequency of data release - IMF Special 
Data Dissemination Standards   Allum and Agca (2001) 
Index Timeliness SDDS 
Index of timeliness of data release - IMF Special 
Data Dissemination Standards   Allum and Agca (2001) 
Foreign owned  Dummy variable for foreign-owned banks  Bankscope 
State owned  Dummy variable for state-owned banks  Bankscope 
English legal origin  Dummy for English legal origin   La Porta et al., 2002 
French legal origin  Dummy for French legal origin   La Porta et al., 2002 
German legal origin  Dummy for German legal origin    La Porta et al., 2002 
Scandinavian legal origin  Dummy for Scandinavian legal origin    La Porta et al., 2002 
Socialist legal origin  
Dummy for Socialist legal origin (La Porta et al., 
2002)   La Porta et al., 2002 
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Formal powers of 
supervisors
Cross-border 
banking 
Mean Minimum Maximum